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 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper investigates the cyclical patterns of buffer capital using an unbalanced panel data for 
the banks in 30 OECD countries and 7 non-OECD Asian countries. We test whether the 
relationships between buffer capital and business cycle are systematically different across country 
groups controlling for other potential determinants of bank capital. We find that the correlation is 
positive for developed countries while it is negative for Asian developing countries. These findings 
suggest that, once Basel II is implemented, developing countries are more likely to observe an 
increase in output volatility. We then review the policy recommendations to mitigate the 
procyclicality problem of Basel II. 
 
 
 
 
본 연구는 30개 OECD 회원국과 7개 아
시아 국가 은행들의 재무제표를 통해 구축
된 불균형 패널자료를 이용하여 은행 자기
자본의 경기순환적 패턴을 살펴본 것이다. 
특히 은행의 잉여자본과 경기순환 간의 관
계가 다른 자기자본 결정요인들의 영향을
고려한 후에도 국가 그룹별로 체계적인 차
이를 나타내는지를 분석하였다. 실증분석
결과, 선진국 은행들에서는 잉여자본과 경
기순환 간에 양(+)의 상관관계가 있으며, 
  
아시아 개도국 은행들에서는 잉여자본과 
경기순환 간에 음(-)의 상관관계가 있는 
것으로 나타났다. 이는 신바젤자기자본협
약(Basel Ⅱ)이 도입될 경우 개도국에서 
경기의 변동성이 더욱 확대될 가능성이 
높음을 시사한다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 
분석을 바탕으로 은행대출의 경기순응성 
문제를 완화하기 위한 감독정책 방안들
을 점검하였다. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
The new Basel accord (Basel II) is expected to promote stability in banking system 
by providing guidance on key banking supervisory issues. The new approach to 
bank capital regulation, at the same time, raises concerns from a macroeconomic 
standpoint. In particular, it has been repeatedly pointed out that the new regulation 
framework is likely to amplify business cycle fluctuations. Under the new Basel II 
framework, the required capital is designed to be in relation to the risks that banks 
would encounter. In recessions, therefore, banks should hold more capital against 
the existing loan portfolio because higher credit risk downgrades existing borrowers. 
To the extent that financing external capital is costly, banks are forced to contract 
lending activity which, in turn, might exacerbate economic downturn. This 
multiplier effect is a financial regulation based propagation mechanism: an initial 
shock to the economy is amplified through a contraction in lending induced by bank 
capital regulations. 
This argument focuses on the procyclicality of required capital, but most banks 
actually hold excess capital well above the required minimum. If excess capital or 
buffer capital fluctuates in a way that mitigates the multiplier effect, the concerns 
about procyclicality could be overstated. Previous research such as Ayuso, Perez, 
and Saurina (2004) contend that potential risks are increased during boom before 
they are materialized in recessions. They argue that a positive correlation between 
buffer capital and business cycle is consistent with forward-looking behavior of 
banks. Forward-looking banks increase buffer capital during booms as they properly 
take into account the potential risks that may accrue during booms. A negative 
correlation, in contrast, suggests that banks underestimate risks over the business 
cycle. 
Motivated by Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004), this paper investigates the 
cyclical patterns of buffer capital using an unbalanced panel data for the banks in 30 
OECD countries and 7 non-OECD Asian countries. In particular, we test whether the 
relationships between buffer capital and business cycle are systematically different 
across country groups controlling for other potential determinants of bank capital. 
We find that, in the periods of high economic growth, the buffer capital ratio rises in 
developed countries while it declines in developing countries. These findings 
suggest that, once Basel II is implemented, developing countries are more likely to 
observe an increase in output volatility. Empirical evidence, therefore, offer a 
support to the presumption that developing countries need more careful policy 
responses than developed countries. 
Indeed, the concerns about the adverse macroeconomic effects appear to be more 
serious in developing countries. Since capital market is less developed and thus 
firms are more bank-dependent in developing countries, it is more difficult for firms 
to find an alternative source of funds when the supply of bank credit decreases. In 
developing countries, therefore, the risk-sensitive capital regulation is likely to 
exacerbate economic recessions more severely. Moreover, banks’ lending decisions 
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in developing countries are heavily dependent upon collateral values that borrowers 
can provide. As far as asset prices move along business cycle, asset prices and 
collateral values decrease in recessions, and thus, affect bank lending and business 
cycle. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the procyclicality issue of 
bank lending associated with financial regulation and provides background 
motivations in the context of Basel II. Section III presents the regression model and 
reports the empirical results. Section IV discusses the supervisory responses 
suggested in previous studies, and finally, Section V is the conclusion.   
 
 
II. Procyclicality of Bank Lending and Basel II 
 
 
1. Procyclicality of Bank Lending and Financial Regulation 
 
Bank lending is expected to exhibit procyclical behavior as the demand for and 
the cost of bank loans fluctuate over business cycle. The demand for bank loans 
should be procyclical as firms’ production and investment and households’ 
consumption are inherently procyclical. The costs to raise funds for lending fluctuate 
counter-cyclically, leading the supply of bank loans procyclical. Moreover, 
prudential regulation on financial institutions is also pointed out as another factor 
that reinforces the procyclicality of bank lending. In particular, the regulation of 
minimum capital requirement has been a long-standing concern for supervisory 
authorities in that the pressures on bank capital in recession could lead to further 
cutbacks in bank lending. On the relationship between capital regulation and bank 
lending, academics and policy circles point out that the impact of capital regulation 
on the procyclicality of bank lending depends on (i) the appropriateness of the risk 
assessment by banks over business cycle and (ii) the sensitivity of regulatory 
measures (e.g. minimum capital requirements) to the estimated risk. 
First, if the assessment of risk fails to take into account its dynamic time-varying 
aspect at each point of time, bank lending would exhibit more procyclical behavior. 
When a short horizon is used for measuring risk, as in most internal rating models of 
banks, the estimated risk tends to be negatively correlated with business cycle. 
Therefore, the estimated risk is higher in recessions, which decreases loan supply. On 
the contrary, risk assessment with longer-term horizon would contribute to 
smoothing the estimated risk and the loan supply over business cycle (Borio et al., 
2001).1  
                                            
1 It is known that there are at least two industry standard rating methods used by banks which may 
lead to a different amount of variability in ratings in a recession. One is the point-in-time (PIT) method 
and the other is the through-the-cycle (TTC) method (Borio et al., 2001, Catarinew-Rabell et al., 2003, 
Kashyap and Stein, 2004). First, under a rating scheme with the PIT method, the current equity price of 
the borrower and current information on the borrower’s liabilities are used to calculate the probability of 
its default, therefore credit ratings may well show more variability as economic conditions change and 
the average rating of a bank’s loan portfolio is likely to change over the course of business cycle. For 
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In addition, if bank lending is highly dependent upon collateral values, a 
decrease in collateral values reduces loan supply in recessions as far as asset prices 
fluctuate over business cycle. Likewise, higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is likely to 
cause larger swings in bank lending since higher LTV ratio implies greater changes 
in new lending given the changes in asset prices. 
Second, in general, a more risk sensitive financial regulation results in more 
procyclical bank lending. In order to cover the expected loss (EL) of their loan 
portfolio, banks are required to make provisions which tend to show a cyclical 
pattern. Given the accounting and tax constraints along with the methodologies used 
to measure risk, banks increase provisions in economic downturns. Thus, the 
marginal cost of bank lending rises in recessions, which leads to more procyclical 
bank lending. To cover the unexpected loss (UL) in a certain time horizon, 
supervisory authorities require banks to hold sufficiently large amount of bank 
capital. In recessions, an increase in the cost of capital leads banks to cut back lending 
rather than to increase their own capital to meet the capital adequacy ratio. Thus, 
more risk-sensitive capital regulations have the potential to lead to larger changes in 
capital requirements and larger swings in bank lending over business cycle.2 
 
 
2. The Effect of Basel II on the Procyclicality of Bank Loans  
 
The New Basel Accord (Basel II) reinforces the capital regulations by applying 
diversified risk weights according to the creditworthiness of the borrowers. One of 
the main objectives underlying the Basel II is, therefore, to substantially increase the 
risk sensitivity of the regulatory capital (that is, minimum capital requirements) for 
banks. Considering that credit risk of bank portfolio tends to increase during an  
                                                                                                               
example, when economic conditions are favorable, loans are likely to move up the rating scale to 
higher-ratings given that the probability of default in the next year (one year horizon) is relatively low. 
Thus the nature of PIT credit rating system means that it does not take possible changes in economic 
climate into account. As a result, measured risk would be negatively correlated with business cycle. 
Second, a rating scheme with the TTC method measures borrowers’ probability of default in a constant 
hypothetical downside scenario and classifies borrowers with similar (stressed) probability of default to 
the same rating grade. Thus, credit ratings are likely to remain through the business cycle, which means 
that credit rating scheme designed to give less variability in ratings in response to changes in economic 
conditions. However, even with the TTC method, an economic downturn that is worse than expected (as 
in stress scenario) is likely to lead to overall ratings being downgraded simultaneously, and thus we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the procyclicality of bank lending significantly increases. Although 
some banks have chosen to adopt rating systems which are modeled on the approach taken by the rating 
agencies, most internal rating systems of banks tend to use the PIT method, and most credit rating 
agencies use the TTC (through-the-cycle) method. 
2 Even if capital requirement is not procyclical, bank capital ratios might still fall in boom and increase 
in recessions owing to market-based pressures (Borio et al., 2001). Banks believed that, after experiencing 
problems in particular, the banks needed to demonstrate their financial strength and their commitment to 
better risk management, and one way of doing so is to report high capital ratio, even if this meant severely 
cutting back the size of the balance sheet and sacrificing long-term banking relationships. 
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[Figure 1] Capital Requirements for Corporate Exposures under Basel II 
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Note: 1) The Capital Requirements are calculated using the formula under the Advanced Internal 
Ratings Based (A-IRB) Approach 
2) CP2 assumes that LGD is 50%, maturity is 3 years, 99.5% confidence level, following the 
calibration of the Second Consultative Paper (CP2), and includes Expected Loss (EL). 
3) CP3 assumes that LGD is 45%, maturity is 2.5 years, 99.9% confidence level, following the 
calibration of the Third Consultative Paper (CP3), and includes Expected Loss (EL). 
4) Final assumes that LGD is 45%, maturity is 2.5 years, 99.9% confidence level, following the 
calibration of the Third Consultative Paper (CP3), excludes Expected Loss (EL), and considers 
Unexpected Loss (UL) only. 
 
 
economic downturn, the minimum required capital depends on the business cycle, 
especially when banks are under the risk-sensitive capital regulations such as Basel II 
(Catarinew-Rabell et al., 2003). In recessions, as bank profitability decreases and the 
cost of raising new capital rises, an increase in capital requirement would force banks 
to reduce their lending or curtail the supply of new loans, thereby further deepening 
economic downturns or prolonging recessions. Thus, the procyclicality of bank 
lending appears to be more serious under Basel II.  
Basel II offers two approaches for the setting of credit risk-based capital 
requirements: Standardized Approach and Internal-Ratings Based Approach. Under 
the Standardized Approach (SA), banks will be permitted to make use of external 
credit ratings provided by the acknowledged rating agencies, so called ECAI 
(external credit assessment institution), to apply different risk weights that ranges 
from 20% to 150%. Since rating agencies consider firms’ profitability and growth 
potential, which are inherently procyclical, the ratings generally tend to move 
upward (downward) in expansions (recessions). 
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Under the Internal-Ratings Based (IRB) Approach, banks are allowed to use 
internal ratings of credit risk to calculate minimum required capital, which uses 
more sensitive risk weights ranging from as little as 3% to as much as 600% and 
more. As the risk factors including the probability of default (PD), loss given default 
(LGD), and exposure at default (EAD) tend to increase in expansions and decrease in 
recessions, it is quite natural to expect greater cyclicality of the minimum capital 
requirements. In further, since credit ratings measured by banks’ internal model 
using PIT method are known to be more volatile than those by rating agencies using 
the TTC method over business cycle, more banks are expected to choose IRB 
Approach, and thus, bank lending is likely to become more procyclical.  
At an earlier stage when the first draft of the Basel II was released, extensive 
debates have been prompted in policy circles concerning the potential procyclicality 
effect of bank loans due to the more risk sensitive capital requirements. For instance, 
Segoviano and Lowe(2002), Borio et al.(2001), and Turner(2000) argue that 
implementation of Basel II significantly extends the procyclicality of bank lending, 
and thereafter, economies are most likely to have larger swings in business cycle, 
which will negatively affect the stability of financial system.  
Several studies also back up the argument by providing the simulation results 
that the minimum capital requirement may fluctuate more counter-cyclically under 
Basel II. The simulation results suggest that bank lending may become more 
procyclical. For example, Segoviano and Lowe (2002) use a transition matrix 
constructed with internal credit ratings of banks in Mexico to examine how capital 
requirements might have changed over time if Basel II’s Foundation IRB (F-IRB) 
Approach had been in place. They conclude that minimum capital requirement 
could have increased significantly in the aftermath of the Peso Crisis in December 
1994 and that if actual capital shows the same cyclical variation under the New 
Accord, business cycle fluctuations may be amplified.3 Moreover, Catarinew-Rabell, 
et al. (2003) also examine the potential procyclicality of bank loans to find that the 
likelihood of sharp increase in capital requirements in recessions could be bigger 
under Basel II when rating schemes of banks are conditioned on the current point in 
the cycle (i.e. PIT type), but rating schemes designed to be more stable over the cycle 
(i.e. TTC type), akin to those of the external rating agencies, would increase 
procyclicality in a smaller scale. 
Recognizing the importance of possible procyclical effects of the New Accord, the 
Basel Committee made various modifications to mitigate the problems. For example, 
the slope of risk-weight curve to the default probability of corporate loans had been 
lowered, which implies that the new capital requirements are less risk sensitive than 
earlier proposals. Banks are also allowed to treat some types of SME loans as retail 
loans, which need lower capital requirements and are less risk sensitive.4 For the 
                                            
3 According to Hong (2004), this result might be an overestimate as the proportion of rated corporate 
exposures in developing countries is reported as being close to 20% on average. In the result of the BIS’s 
second Quantity Impact Study (QIS 2), the proportions of rated corporate exposures are reported as 29% 
for G10 and EU banks, but 19% for banks in other regions. 
4 The idea is that dispersion of small loans over many counterparties in the retail portfolio may have 
smaller credit risk than the same size of portfolio consisted of corporate loans. 
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banks to adopt the IRB Approach, it is recommended that they consider the business 
cycle effects when making decisions on the borrowers’ credit ratings, which 
implicitly encourage banks to estimate TTC ratings instead of PIT ratings. In addition, 
the Committee has emphasized that adequate stress testing under the Pillar 2 would 
dampen the cyclical impact of Basel II since banks need to show that their capital is 
sufficient to cope with a recession without a reduction in their lending.  
It is not still clear, however, whether these modifications would sufficiently 
reduce the procyclicality of bank lending in developing countries. The impact of the 
modification may differ across countries.5 Compared to advanced countries, the 
sophisticated financial techniques are less developed and the risk profiles of asset 
portfolios are different in developing countries.6 Extending the scope of Segoviano 
and Lowe (2002), Hong (2004) concludes that similar findings about procyclicality of 
bank lending under Basel II would hold in Korea. In utilizing corporate exposure 
data for a major Korean bank (including borrowers’ internal ratings, credit scores, 
historical default rates, outstanding exposures, and overdue status), he found though 
the SA of Basel II is not likely to raise minimum capital requirements to any great 
extent in Korea, the capital requirements under the F-IRB Approach would have 
increased significantly in the recession after the 1997 Crisis, if Basel II had been in 
place in Korea. He argues that Advanced IRB (A-IRB) Approach with PIT type credit 
risk models is likely to lead to much more volatile capital requirements than the 
F-IRB Approach. He also argues that the potential impact of Basel II on the 
movement of capital requirements would be significant for developing countries in 
recessions and that the advanced approaches of Basel II may not provide incentives 
for the banks in developing countries to reduce regulatory capital requirements since 
the calibration and revisions of Basel II have not been based on a broader area of 
samples that include those banks. 
Meanwhile, we observe that most banks maintain excess capital (buffer capital) 
over the required minimum. Using a large data set of OECD countries, Bikker and 
Metzermakers (2004) present that between 1994 and 2001, the median BIS ratio 
fluctuated for around 12.2%, an ample 50% above the minimum. 7  These 
observations underline that banks have incentives to set a target level of capital 
above the required one. Banks may assess the risk of their asset portfolio as being 
higher than the outcome of the Basel I scheme. Or they may be more risk averse and 
wish to hold capital buffers for funding at lower costs. Banks also have incentives to 
keep buffers above the required minimum capital adequacy ratios, both for their 
                                            
5 Note, however, that Goodhart et al. (2004) find that procyclicality may well still be a serious problem 
with Basel II even after the smoothing of the risk curves using Moody’s data for the USA from 1982 to 2003, 
for Norway from 1988 to 2001, and for Mexico from 1995 to 2000. 
6 Similar points about the impact of Basel II on developing countries were made by Powell (2002). He 
claims that developing countries are most likely to have difficulties in implementing Basel II because the 
calibration of capital requirements for IRB Approaches does not consider the risk profiles or lending 
practices of banks in those countries. Also see Segoviano and Lowe (2002). 
7 Under the Basel I, the first Basel Accord on minimum capital requirements for internationally active 
banks that introduced in 1988, a bank’s actual capital as a percentage of its risk-weighted assets (BIS ratio) 
must not fall below 8%. 
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protection against sanctions taken by supervisory authorities and to satisfy rating 
agencies. 
Given that most banks hold sizable buffer capital, the capital requirement under 
Basel II may not be a binding constraint on banks’ lending operations. If banks’ 
capital targets are generally well above the minimum requirements and the buffer 
capital fluctuates in a way that reduces the volatility of capital, the procyclicality of 
bank loans would be mitigated. If banks hold buffer capital to cover the risk more 
than implied by Basel I, the procyclicality would increase only to a limited degree 
under Basel II. Therefore, findings of previous studies based on the regulatory 
capital without any considerations on the buffer capital do not provide sufficient 
evidence to address the potential problems of the procyclicality. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate the movement of buffer capital as well as the minimum 
required capital since bank lending depends not only on the regulatory capital but 
also on the buffer capital. 
 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
 
1. Motivation 
 
This section empirically investigates the cyclical patterns of buffer capital using 
an unbalanced panel data for the banks in 30 OECD countries and 7 non-OECD 
Asian countries. For instance, the Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004) contend that 
potential risks are increasing during booms before they are materialized in recessions. 
They argue that a positive correlation between buffer capital and business cycle is 
consistent with forward-looking behavior of banks. Forward-looking banks increase 
buffer capital during booms as they properly take into account the potential risks 
that may accrue during booms. A negative correlation, in contrast, suggests that 
banks underestimate risks over the business cycle. Accordingly, we may expect that 
the procyclicality issue is more serious if buffer capital fluctuates counter-cyclically. 
Our main objective is to investigate whether the relationships between buffer 
capital and business cycle are systematically different across country groups 
controlling for other potential determinants of bank capital. In further, Ayuso, Perez, 
and Saurina found significant negative relationship using a sample of Spanish 
commercial and savings banks for the period of 1986-2000. Lindquist (2004) also 
reports that buffer capital is negatively correlated with economic growth in 
Norwegian bank-level panel data. As admitted in the previous research, however, it 
is difficult to generalize the conclusions from a single country study. To our 
knowledge, Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) is the only comparable study that uses 
an international data set, but their sample consists of the banks in advanced 
countries only.  
Indeed, it is often argued that the adverse impacts of the new risk-sensitive bank 
capital regulation on business cycle fluctuations appear to be larger in developing 
countries. Since capital market is less developed and thus firms are more 
bank-dependent in developing countries, it is more difficult for firms to find an 
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alternative source of funds when the supply of bank credit decreases. Recently, 
Huizinga and Zhu (2006) examine how financial structure matters for 
macroeconomic volatility and find that aggregate output is more variable in case of 
heavy reliance on debt financing. Their study indicates that countries with less 
developed capital market would experience more volatile business cycle.  
Moreover, we can imagine that asymmetric information problems between 
lenders and borrowers are severe in developing countries. Reliable information on 
firms’ credit risk, in particular on small firms’ risk, is not largely available in 
developing countries. Banks’ lending decisions in these countries, therefore, depend 
heavily on collateral values that borrowers can provide. Theories on credit cycles 
predict that collateral-based lending practice can generate a finance-based 
propagation mechanism through which business cycle fluctuations are amplified. In 
recessions, a fall in asset prices lower the collateral values and thereby reduces the 
amount of bank loans. The decrease in bank loans, in turn, aggravates business cycle 
downturns. Procyclical collateral values along with banks’ lending practice intensify 
the concerns about the adverse impacts on business cycle.  
 
 
 2. Empirical Specification and the Data 
 
Based on Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), 
we estimate the following reduced-form equation, 
 
,6543211 ijtjtijtijtijtijtijtijtijt eGDPROALOANSIZENPLROEBUFBUF ++++++++= − γββββββα
 
where tji ,,  denote bank, country, and time, respectively. The dependent 
variable, BUF, is the buffer capital ratio defined as a bank’s buffer capital (total 
capital less required capital) divided by its required capital. ROE is the return on 
equity and NPL is the ratio of non-performing loans (impaired loans) to total loans. 
SIZE denotes the log of total asset and LOAN is the loan growth rates. ROA denotes 
the return on asset. GDP is the deviation of GDP growth rate from its country 
specific average. Other than these variables, we also include country dummies and 
year dummies to control for idiosyncratic country characteristics and year specific 
global business cycle factors. 
We define the buffer capital ratio in the same manner as in Ayuso, Perez, and 
Saurina (2004), while Lindquist (2004) uses a ratio of buffer capital to risk-weighed 
asset. Given that the required capital amounts to eight percent of risk-weighted 
capital, however, these two buffer capital ratios are essentially the same. Moreover, it 
is worthwhile to note that the buffer capital ratio, whether excess capital is 
normalized by required capital or risk-weighted capital, also corresponds to a simple 
transformation of BIS capital ratio (capital divided by risk weighted asset). Therefore, 
replacing buffer capital ratio with BIS capital ratio should yield the same empirical 
results qualitatively and thus economic interpretation on the behavior of buffer 
capital ratio should also be valid for the behavior of BIS capital ratio. 
The empirical model in this paper is consistent with a simple partial adjustment 
model, in which a bank’s current buffer capital ratio adjusts to its optimal level. 
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Motivated by real investment models, Ayuso, Perez, and Saurina (2004) provide a 
theoretical background derived from a cost minimizing problem of a representative 
bank. Estrella (2004) also presents a dynamic model of optimal capital in which 
banks minimize costs associated with failure, holding capital, and flows of external 
capital. 
Following the previous literature, we also assume that a representative bank sets 
its optimal buffer capital ratio taking into account the trade-off between cost of 
capital and default probability. More capital incurs higher cost of holding capital. In 
addition, theories on asymmetric information predict that raising capital is more 
costly than other types of liabilities. More capital, on the other hand, may reduce the 
probability of failure, and thereby, reduce the bankruptcy costs. Moreover, if banks 
fail to meet capital requirements, supervisory authorities usually place some 
restrictions on bank’s activity and thus banks might lose reputation. 
We assume that the cost of capital is proportional to the level of capital and 
approximated by the returns on equity (ROE). To the extent that ROE reflects the 
cost of raising and holding capital, ROE has negative correlation with buffer capital 
ratio. We expect that NPL proxies for the risks that banks may face. Banks with 
higher probability of default may need to increase the buffer capital ratio. However, 
since NPL is an ex post measurement of the risks assumed by banks, banks with 
higher NPL need to hold more capital to keep their capital adequacy ratio above the 
required minimum and thus less buffer capital. Therefore, the expected sign of the 
coefficient on NPL is negative. 
Additionally, we also consider a bank’s size variable defined by the log of a 
bank’s asset in the regression. Lindquist (2004) provides several channels by which 
bank size affects the buffer capital ratio. First, scale economies enable large banks to 
reduce monitoring and screening cost and thereby lower optimal level of capital. 
Second, large banks are generally able to easily diversify the risks and thus be able to 
keep buffer capital ratio lower than small banks. Third, according to the ‘too big to 
fail’ hypothesis, large banks may believe that they will receive support from the 
regulators. 
In addition, we include loan growth rate and ROA in the regression. Suppose that 
total capital is constant or adjusting capital is very costly. Then, an increase in loans 
implies an increase in required capital and a decrease in buffer capital, which lowers 
buffer capital ratio. Therefore, as far as loan growth is procyclical, buffer capital ratio 
is likely to be negatively correlated with business cycle. Including loan growth rate 
allows us to examine additional cyclical pattern of buffer capital, controlling for 
this possibility of mechanical negative correlation. We include ROA for similar 
reason as ROA indicates the ability to retain earnings which is an important part of 
capital.  
 While these bank balance sheet variables characterize the factors that may affect 
optimal capital level, the lagged dependent variable captures the adjustment cost. 
Previous theoretical and empirical literature that studies procyclical aspect of bank 
capital use partial adjustment model to find a non-negligible adjustment cost.  
Our main purpose of the regression analysis is to investigate the relationship 
between buffer capital ratio and the business cycle, controlling for other potential 
determinants of buffer capital ratio. The coefficient estimate on GDP growth 
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provides evidence on how the banks have changed buffer capital over the business 
cycle. We further investigate whether the cyclical pattern of buffer capital ratio is 
different between advanced countries and emerging market Asian countries. To do 
this, we construct regional dummy variables to test for the differential effect of 
business cycle on the buffer capital which include Asian countries include Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Korea.8 
Among the OECD countries, we select and construct a dummy variable for Basel 
committee member countries which are believed to have more advanced banking 
industry.9  
We obtain bank balance sheet data from the Bankscope database and GDP series 
from the International Financial Statistics. The sample consists of large commercial 
banks from 37 countries with valid information on capital, total asset, loans, ROE, 
ROA, non-performing loans over the 1995-2004 period.10 
 
 
3. Estimation Results 
 
Table 1 presents the sample mean of the bank characteristics for each country 
group. The average buffer capital ratio in our sample is 50.6% which is equivalent to 
12.1% of BIS capital ratio. Banks in Asian countries maintain much higher buffer 
capital and BIS capital ratio than OECD countries during the sample period. The 
outbreak of East Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the subsequent restructuring of 
financial institutions in East Asia could cause higher buffer capital ratio in the region, 
yet the number is still above 70% over the period 2002-2004. Financial crisis also 
explains high non-performing loan ratio (NPL) in Asian countries. 
The profitability of banks in Asian countries, however, is lower than OECD 
countries: ROE for the banks in Asian countries recorded 7.4% on average, which is 
lower than 11.3% in OECD countries and 15.6% in the US. Loan growth rate is also 
lower in Asian countries compared to other advanced countries. 
We first examine how buffer capital ratio has changed over the business cycle on 
average. Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates on bank characteristics and GDP 
with the associated t-values. The second column shows the estimation results from 
pooled OLS with country dummy variables and year dummy variables. Since the 
correlation between GDP and year dummy variable may affect the coefficient 
estimate on GDP, we re-estimate the equation without year dummy variables. The 
result for this exercise is reported in the third column (Model II). We also attempt to 
estimate cyclical pattern of buffer capital ratio excluding loan growth which is also 
believed to be procyclical and thus affect the coefficient on GDP (Model III).  
The coefficient on the lagged buffer capital ratio is estimated significantly, 
                                            
8 Although Korea is an OECD member, we classify Korea as an Asian country. 
9  Basel committee member countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the US. 
10 Some outliers are excluded from the sample. The sample requires that BIS capital ratio is between 0 
and 0.3, ROE is between -50% and 100%, NPL is less than 50%, and loan growth rate is between -100% and 
100%. 
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<Table 1> Sample mean of bank characteristics   
 Total OECD Basel US Other 
OECD 
Asia 
BUF 
BIS 
ROE 
NPL 
SIZE 
LOAN 
ROA 
50.56 
12.05 
10.97 
3.31 
8.66 
9.65 
0.90 
47.79 
11.82 
11.30 
2.89 
8.66 
9.81 
0.92 
47.62 
11.81 
11.11 
2.90 
8.57 
9.37 
0.91 
58.41 
12.67 
15.59 
0.68 
8.54 
12.13 
1.32 
50.08 
12.01 
13.81 
2.79 
9.87 
15.51 
0.95 
80.87 
14.47 
7.35 
7.95 
8.70 
7.90 
0.69 
Source: Bankscope database 
  
<Table 2> Estimation results I  
 Model I Model II Model III 
Constant 
Lagged Dep. Var. 
ROE 
NPL 
SIZE 
LOAN 
ROA 
GDP 
44.919 (2.22)** 
0.641 (9.65) *** 
-0.543 (-3.34) *** 
-0.281 (-1.61) 
-0.518 (-1.73) * 
-0.298 (-9.71) *** 
10.030 (4.18) *** 
0.159 (0.75) 
44.202 (2.34) ** 
0.641 (9.67) *** 
-0.534 (-3.34) *** 
-0.277 (-1.60) 
-0.539 (-1.75) * 
-0.296 (-9.87) *** 
9.927 (4.18) *** 
0.005 (0.03) 
21.304 (1.19) 
0.645 (9.67) *** 
-0.559 (-3.37) *** 
-0.032 (-0.18) 
-0.255 (-0.85) 
 
9.859 (4.00) *** 
0.225 (0.97) 
Country dummy 
Year dummy 
No. observation 
R2 
Yes 
Yes 
3907 
0.70 
Yes 
No 
3907 
0.70 
Yes 
Yes 
3907 
0.69 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence levels. 
 
 
suggesting a substantial adjustment cost. The coefficient estimate on ROE, a proxy 
for the cost of capital, is negative and statistically significant, implying that higher 
cost of capital has a negative impact on bank’s capital accumulation. The buffer 
capital ratio, however, is not correlated with our risk proxies. The coefficient estimate 
on NPL has a negative sign as expected, though statistically insignificant. 
Meanwhile, we find that the coefficient on SIZE is negative, though significant 
only at 10% level. It predicts that large banks are more likely to hold less buffer 
capital. As mentioned above, the negative size effect is consistent with economies of 
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scale, the ability to diversify risks, or ‘too big to fail’ hypothesis. Previous studies also 
report negative size effect. As expected, we find buffer capital ratio is negatively 
correlated with loan growth rate and positively correlated with ROA. 
Now we turn to the estimated relationship between buffer capital and business 
cycle. Model I in Table 2 shows that coefficient estimate on GDP is 0.16, but not 
statistically significant, implying that, on average, buffer capital ratio is not 
correlated with business cycle. Since the estimation results in Model II and Model III 
are qualitatively the same, we conclude that year dummy variables or loan growth 
rate do not affect the estimated cyclical aspect of buffer capital ratio.11  
The findings in Table 2 suggest that, in general, buffer capital ratio does not 
fluctuate systematically over the business cycle. Nevertheless, it is possible that 
buffer capital ratio shows procyclical or counter-cyclical patterns in some countries 
or regions. We attempt to find a heterogeneous behavior among country groups.  
Table 3 presents the estimation results from the regression allowing for a 
possibility of different correlation between buffer capital ratio and business cycle 
across country groups. The second column in Table 3 reports the coefficient 
estimates on GDP along with other coefficient estimates for two country groups: 
Asian countries and OECD countries.12 In contrast to Table 2, the estimation result in 
Table 3 tells a different story: buffer capital is positively correlated with GDP in 
OECD countries while negatively correlated with GDP in Asian countries. The 
coefficient estimate is 1.03 for OECD countries and it is statistically significant, but it 
is -0.55 for Asian countries with marginal significance. 
Moreover, we further classify OECD countries into two groups, the Basel 
committee member countries and non-member OECD countries, to compare the 
procyclical aspects of the buffer capital ratio among OECD countries. The third 
column in Table 3 shows that buffer capital ratio is positively correlated with GDP 
for the Basel committee member countries. In contrast, the correlation is negative and 
not statistically significant for other OECD countries. These results tell us that the 
banks in the Basel committee member countries increase their buffer capital ratio in 
expansions while the banks in other countries do not increase or decrease the buffer 
capital ratio. In the fourth column in Table 3, we test whether the positive correlation 
is driven by the US. The results show that although the procyclicality of buffer 
capital appears to be stronger in the US banks, a statistically significant positive 
relationship between buffer capital ratio and GDP is estimated in the other Basel 
committee member countries as well.   
The estimation results in Table 3 show different cyclical patterns of buffer capital 
across country groups. The buffer capital ratio rises in Basel committee member 
countries while it declines in Asian countries in the periods of high economic growth. 
These findings suggest that, once Basel II is implemented, Asian countries are more 
                                            
11 Other balance sheet variables are also likely to be correlated with business cycle. For example, ROE 
tends to increase in expansionary periods while NPL rises in recessions. Excluding ROE and NPL, 
however, does not change the estimation results qualitatively. The estimated coefficients on GDP are 0.186, 
0.049, and 0.232 with the associated t-values of 0.84, 0.29, and 1.00 for Model I, Model II, and Model III 
respectively from the regressions without ROE and NPL. 
12 Korea is a member of OECD, but is included in Asian country group. 
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<Table 3> Estimation Results II 
 
 I II III 
Constant 
Lagged Dep. Var. 
ROE 
NPL 
SIZE 
LOAN 
ROA 
GDP OECD 
        Basel 
           USA 
           others 
        Non-Basel 
     Asia 
48.336 (2.38) ** 
0.640 (9.65) *** 
-0.552 (-3.41) *** 
-0.287 (-1.65) * 
-0.528 (-1.76) * 
-0.296 (-9.67) *** 
10.058 (4.21) *** 
1.034 (2.38) ** 
 
 
 
 
-0.547 (-1.98) ** 
44.114 (2.19) ** 
0.640 (9.66) *** 
-0.558 (-3.45) *** 
-0.293 (-1.69) * 
-0.551 (-1.84) * 
-0.293 (-9.60) *** 
10.061 (4.21) *** 
 
2.033 (5.27) *** 
 
 
-0.229 (-0.62) 
-0.490 (-1.78) * 
44.445 (2.20) ** 
0.640 (9.66) *** 
-0.547 (-3.37) *** 
-0.306 (-1.77) * 
-0.583 (-1.94) * 
-0.291 (-9.57) *** 
9.974 (4.16) *** 
 
 
2.754 (4.40) *** 
1.528 (3.40) *** 
-0.198 (-0.53) 
-0.511 (-1.86) * 
Country dummy 
Year dummy 
No. observation 
R2 
Yes 
Yes 
3907 
0.70 
Yes 
Yes 
3907 
0.70 
Yes 
Yes 
3907 
0.69 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% confidence levels. 
 
 
likely to observe an increase in output volatility.13 The empirical findings reinforce 
the concern that developing countries are more likely to be influenced by the new 
bank capital regulation. Indeed, since bank credit is the more important source of 
funds in developing countries, a decrease in bank loans might exacerbate economic 
                                            
13 There could be an alternative interpretation of the estimation results in Table 3. The procyclical 
buffer capital ratios for the banks in the Basel committee member countries may imply that those banks are 
already operating as if they are under Basel II - that is, they are aligning capital with risk. During booms, 
for example, banks with advanced risk management system may become more likely to originate 
lower-quality loans since they can charge higher interest rates and earn bigger profits, and these banks 
may have to increase buffer capital knowing that the quality of their loan portfolios will be deteriorating 
fast in the near future. Based on this interpretation, one may say that positive correlation between buffer 
capital and business cycle is an evidence of more resilient risk management practices of banks under Basel 
I, and countries with such banks are more likely to have the procyclical bank lending problem. Evaluating 
this argument versus the forward-looking risk measurement story would be interesting, but due to the 
limitations of data availability we would like to leave it for the future research. The authors would like to 
thank the anonymous referee who suggested this alternative interpretation. 
192    韓國開發硏究 / 2007. Ⅰ  
 
 
recession more severely. In advanced countries such as Basel committee member 
countries, in contrast, the procyclicality issue might not be a great concern. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the empirical results are from the regression 
using the sample observations under Basel I14 and the predictions are based on the 
assumption that banks continue to maintain their behavior under Basel II. If banks 
change their behavior under Basel II, our predictions may be changed. 
 
 
IV. Policy Implications 
 
 
Empirical findings in this paper suggest that developing countries need 
appropriate policy responses to the potential procyclicality problems under Basel II. 
In what follows, we review some policy recommendations that have been discussed 
among academics and policy circles.15 
First, the financial supervisory authorities need to encourage banks to have 
longer time horizon over which risk is measured and managed.16 It is important to 
recognize that risk is actually building up in booms, and that bad loans are 
materialized in recessions, which does not necessarily imply an increase in risk. If 
banks do not under-estimate risks in booms and do not over-estimate risks in 
recessions, the potential problem of excessive business cycle fluctuation could be 
alleviated. For this purpose, the supervisory authorities can establish rules 
contingent to business cycle to promote long-horizon risk measurement. In fact, 
Basel Committee recommends banks to adopt the IRB Approach in the revised draft 
of the new accord, in which banks are encouraged to use forward looking TTC 
method instead of PIT ratings for their credit rating system.17 
                                            
14 This may be a reason why the impact of the business cycle on the banks’ buffer capital, despite 
being statistically significant, seems to be moderate in quantitative terms. That is, an increase of 1 
percentage point in GDP growth rate for OECD countries, for example, increases the risk-based total 
capital ratio by only 0.08 percent. Also, the long-term semi-elasticity of the buffer capital relative to GDP 
growth, calculated at the sample buffer average, is only 6 percent that means when the GDP growth rates 
increases by 1 percent, the total capital ratio increases by 0.23 percent in the long-run. However, given the 
highly volatile GDP growth rates of Asian emerging markets, the magnitude of counter-cyclical changes in 
buffer capital can be economically significant under Basel II. 
15 Borio, Furfine, and Lowe (2001) provide a good reference on the policy options to the procyclicality 
problems. 
16 If banks have excessively long horizon to the extent that the measured risk converges to the 
historical average, capital requirement would become less sensitive to risk. Thus, it should be addressed 
that excessively long horizon is not consistent with the main goal of Basel II to achieve the stability in 
banking system. 
17 Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003) also concludes that, under the IRB Approach with PIT method where 
current information on borrowers’ equity price and book liabilities is used to obtain estimates of 
borrowers’ probability of default, and the risk weights determined based on this model are highly sensitive 
to current economic conditions since cyclical effects in asset valuation would be reflected in the default 
probabilities. 
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Second, the authorities can use its supervisory instruments in a discretionary 
fashion. For instance, the supervisory authorities can require banks to increase buffer 
capital during booms if they judge, based on all available evidence, that risks are 
under-estimated. Another example is that the supervisory authorities can change 
loan-to-value ratios in lending for real estate property. If the authorities could 
correctly evaluate risk arising from an excessive increase in property prices, the 
loan-to-value ratios might be lowered until the property prices are stabilized. This 
discretionary approach could prevent undesirable swings in property prices, and 
also could help accomplish the stability of collateral values and business cycle.  
Third, the financial authorities in developing countries need to improve the 
infrastructure of financial system. Among others, creating and upgrading credit 
bureaus is crucial. If reliable credit information is largely available to banks, lending 
decisions would become less dependent upon collateral and thus the impact of asset 
price cycle on business cycle would decline. In addition, establishing a good 
accounting and governance standard is a prerequisite for better financial system. 
 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
As minimum requirements for bank capital will become more risk-sensitive and 
thus fluctuate more strongly with the business cycle under Basel II, it is widely 
expected that bank lending may be reduced during cyclical downturns and this 
could harm economic development if minimum capital requirements were binding. 
However, the question arises whether actual capital levels also become more cyclical 
under Basel II. As almost all banks have their capital well above the required 
minimum, more volatile regulatory capital would increase procyclicality of bank 
lending only to a limited degree in Basel II. Therefore, even if the minimum capital 
required by regulations fluctuate to a greater extent under Basel II, it is necessary to 
investigate the movement of buffer capital of banks. 
To address this call, this paper empirically investigates the cyclical patterns of 
buffer capital using an unbalanced panel data for the banks in 30 OECD countries 
and 7 non-OECD Asian countries. The estimation results show systematically 
different cyclical patterns of buffer capital across country groups. The buffer capital 
ratio rises in Basel committee member countries while it declines in Asian countries 
during the period of high economic growth. These findings suggest that, once Basel 
II is implemented, Asian countries are more likely to observe an increase in output 
volatility. Furthermore, in some of the Asian countries where bank credit is the more 
important source of funds, a decrease in bank loans induced by the risk-sensitive 
capital regulation by Basel II might exacerbate economic recession more severely.  
These findings suggest that some appropriate policy responses will be requested, 
especially in Asian developing countries. Regulatory authorities of these countries 
should keep in mind that the possibility of expanding procyclicality can be emerged 
as the most critical constraint on the economic policy planning, especially in a 
downturn. Therefore, successful implementation of the new capital standard will 
depend on how one might design a credible, transparent formula that links capital 
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requirements to some measure of aggregate economic conditions. This is a difficult 
question and one that we are not prepared to answer fully.  
This paper reviews some of such policy responses commonly suggested in the 
previous literature and draws implications for Basel II implementation that it is 
important to balance the pros and cons of the measures for reducing procyclicality 
since some measures may not help the banking system to accomplish stability if they 
restrict risk assessment of banks too strictly. 
Lastly, it should be noted that those predictions regarding procyclicality are from 
the regression using the sample observations under Basel I. It is not clear in advance 
whether banks will change their capital accumulation behavior after the 
implementation of Basel II. If banks change their behavior under Basel II, our 
predictions are not valid and we may reach different conclusions. Nevertheless, it is 
worth to investigate the cyclical behavior of banks over the last decade, since this 
behavior will probably also be typical after Basel II and the detected patterns also 
may be continued.  
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